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Self-instigated isolation is heavily relied on to curb SARS-CoV-2 transmission. Accounting for 22 
uncertainty in the latent and prepatent periods, as well as the proportion of infections that remain 23 
asymptomatic, the limits of this intervention at different phases of infection resurgence are 24 
estimated. We show that by October, SARS-CoV-2 transmission rates in England had already begun 25 
exceeding levels that could be interrupted using this intervention alone, lending support to the 26 
second national lockdown on November 5th.  27 
 28 
Main text 29 
A general population lockdown occurred in England on 23rd March 2020 to reduce SARS-CoV-2 30 
transmission. This drastic intervention successfully inhibited disease spread by rapidly depleting the 31 
opportunities for transmission events between infected and susceptible people remaining in general 32 
circulation [1].  33 
Subsequent to easing out of lockdown from July 4
th
 2020, infections resurged and England entered 34 
its second national lockdown on November 5th 2020. The return of millions of (largely susceptible) 35 
people to general circulation underlies the epidemic re-entering an exponential growth phase. 36 
However, also culpable in the current public health emergency is the failure of interventions during 37 
the period following lockdown’s release. 38 
Contact tracing endeavours to reduce SARS-CoV-2 transmission have thus far proven ineffective in 39 
England and so isolation is primarily instigated by those responding to symptoms’ development in 40 
themselves or their close associations [2]. The mechanism by which this reactive isolation operates is 41 
importantly distinct from pre-emptive mass quarantine (lockdown). Symptoms-prompted, reactive 42 
isolation only applies to individuals who are infected (c.f. the total population), and, more 43 
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specifically, to those who register symptoms. Hence infectious individuals who have not yet 44 
experienced symptoms, or who will never experience them, are missed.  45 
The mathematical epidemiology of reactive isolation is fairly nascent yet critical in the context of the 46 
current epidemic. Here, we generate estimates for reactive isolation thresholds that account for 47 
uncertainties in the latent and pre-patent period of infection as well as in the proportion of infected 48 
individuals that register and respond appropriately to symptoms. 49 
 50 
Mathematical derivation of reactive self-isolation 51 
Beginning with the simplest derivation for physical isolation: the pre-emptive quarantine threshold 52 
proportion (Q) is Q > (1 – (1/R)) where ‘R’ is the reproduction number [3]. For reactive isolation (Q*), 53 
this threshold is inflated to account for the leaked infections occurring because of the delay between 54 
becoming infectious and first exhibiting symptoms: Q* > (1 – (1/R)) x [ ((g-1)/g)^-(p-l) ]. Respectively, 55 
p and l are the prepatent and latent period of infection (in days), and g is the mean duration of 56 
infectiousness (12 days on average [4]). If symptoms typically develop at the same time as an 57 
individual becomes infectious, the square-bracket component equals one and the original threshold 58 
(Q) is regained. A further modification can be made to account for the proportion of infections that 59 
never give rise to symptoms (denoted ‘a’): Q** > (1/(1 - a)) x (1 – (1/R)) x [ ((g-1)/g)^-(p-l) ]. For 60 
example, if half of infections remained asymptomatic, the proportion of symptomatic infections that 61 
need to be isolated to achieve an equivalent impact must be doubled. As with those who never 62 
develop symptoms, individuals who fail to respond appropriately to developing symptoms – early 63 
indication is that this is not a negligible proportion [5] – will continue to contribute to transmission, 64 
so ‘a’ could be considered a composite of these two proportions. 65 
 66 
 67 
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Accounting for uncertainty in parametrization 68 
The latent and prepatent periods are quite variable for COVID-19 patients. Instead of single point 69 
estimates for these parameters, collated data form a distribution of reported times. The latent 70 
period is drawn at random from a Weibull distribution and then subtracted from the random draw 71 
from a second Weibull distribution depicting the range of reported prepatent periods. Fig 1A 72 
illustrates these distributions as informed by the clinical and epidemiological literature [6-8]. Also 73 
shown is the distribution of times between development of infectiousness and symptoms onset as 74 
fitted to 10,000 random draws. The distributions of prepatent and latent periods overlap so to avoid 75 
the possibility of symptoms developing prior to infectiousness, random draws whereby 76 
infectiousness trailed the day of symptoms onset were removed and resampled. 10,000 random 77 
draws were then made from this newly derived distribution of the delay between infectiousness and 78 
symptoms, and the isolation threshold (Q**) was estimated for a range of R values and a range of 79 
asymptomatic proportions (Python code: https://github.com/lwyakob/COVIDquarantine). 80 
 81 
Isolation thresholds accounting for uncertainty 82 
Fig 1B shows the mean isolation threshold required to control SARS-CoV-2 accounting for the range 83 
of estimates for the prepatent and latent periods. The value for R is dynamic, varying according to 84 
current intervention effectiveness and population-level susceptibility, so the isolation threshold is 85 
shown for a range of plausible R values. The form of the relationship between Q* and R shows an 86 
isolation threshold that increases asymptotically with reproduction number. However, allowing for 87 
uncertainty in prepatent and latent periods results in a wide 95% prediction interval. The 88 
interpretation is that when accounting for both the uncertainty in estimating the population mean, 89 
plus the random variation of the individual values, reactive isolation cannot interrupt transmission 90 
(at least 95 times out of 100) if R already exceeds a value of ~2.3.  91 
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Figure 1. A) Dashed lines indicate distributions for the latent (blue, Weibull(α=4, β=2)) and prepatent 93 
period (red, Weibull(α=6, β=3)) as derived from the COVID-19 literature [6-8]. The solid line is the 94 
resulting distribution for the time difference between the two from which 10,000 random draws 95 
were made (inset). B) The isolation threshold (Q*) as calculated for the 10,000 random draws along 96 
with the mean (white line) and 95% predictive interval (dashed lines). The blue cross indicates the 97 
theoretical maximum R number for which reactive isolation may interrupt transmission. C) The 98 
maximum asymptomatic proportion of COVID-19 infections that permits transmission interruption 99 
by reactive isolation for a range of R values (using the expression for Q**). The red boxes illustrate 100 
estimates for England as of October 2020 [9, 10]. 101 
 102 
 103 
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Reactive isolation is further limited when asymptomatic infections comprise a non-negligible 104 
proportion (alternatively, when those exhibiting symptoms fail to isolate themselves to some 105 
degree). Fig 1C shows the theoretical limits of the proportion of infections that can be asymptomatic 106 
and yet SARS-CoV-2 transmission interrupted through isolating symptomatic individuals (using the 107 
Q** expression). Superimposed on this trade-off between the reproduction number and the 108 
isolation threshold are estimates for R in England as of October 2020 [10], and the 95% confidence 109 
and predictive intervals for the proportion of infections that remain asymptomatic as generated by a 110 
living systematic review [9]. Respectively, by October 30% and 60% of these parameter spaces were 111 
already beyond the level at which reactive isolation can be sufficient to interrupt transmission (i.e., 112 
these regions fall to the right of the hatched arc in Fig 1C).  113 
 114 
Limitations and future work 115 
One limitation of the current analysis is the consideration of transmission and control at the 116 
population level rather than stratified by various risk factors. To address this, results were generated 117 
for a full range of R values. It is important to note that stratification would impact the derivation of R 118 
but not the population-level isolation thresholds calculated for a given R value [11]. Another 119 
limitation is the implicit assumption that, in the absence of intervention, asymptomatically infected 120 
individuals contribute to onwards transmission as much as symptomatically infected individuals. It is 121 
unclear how questionable this assumption is but clinical studies indicate that asymptomatic and 122 
symptomatic individuals have similar viral loads [12]. Should evidence arise of their differential 123 
contributions to transmission, the model and code associated with this study can be modified easily 124 
to account for this feature.  125 
Even during pre-emptive quarantine (i.e., lockdown) the formulae described here continue to apply 126 
to those who remain in general circulation (e.g., essential personnel). Future work should look at 127 
how isolation thresholds can be estimated to inform this intervention combination, among others. 128 
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